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Of all the red scares that gripped the West during the twentieth century, it was the concern about communist penetration of the entertainment industry that generated some of the most sensational episodes. Nowhere was this more the case than in the United States of America, exemplified by the notorious challenge 'Are you now, or have you ever been, a member of the Communist Party?' issued by interrogators on the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) to the many hundreds of witnesses summoned to appear before them. While citizens from a range of professions (including teachers, the clergy, and union leaders) would find themselves the subject of a subpoena to appear before the Committee, it was HUAC's investigations into actors, directors, and playwrights in the American theatre and film trade that presented perhaps the most infamous area of HUAC's crusade, leading to a decades-long campaign dedicated to rooting out the perceived communist infiltration Individual directors and actors would allege that they had been denied work because of their political affiliations, and some foreign nationals faced the uncertainty of only being offered short-term visa renewals by the British government rather than the security of documentation granting a longer stay. 6 But these seemed to be local and temporary campaigns rather than a sustained nation-wide policy, and Britain mostly seemed to resist the extremes of anti-communist paranoia that had gripped the USA. 7 No lesser figure than The Queen herself asserted this to be the case, stating to the world in her Coronation Day speech of 1953 that 'Parliamentary institutions, with their free speech and respect for the rights of minorities, and the inspiration of a broad tolerance in thought and expression -all this we conceive to be a precious part of our way of life and outlook' -a statement immediately taken as a coded rebuke of McCarthyism, and an empathic endorsement of British political freedom. 8 As a consequence, many of those blacklisted in their own countries moved to London. As Tony Shaw described:
It is a measure of the greater freedom from political interference the British film industry enjoyed during the Cold War that several prominent blacklistees chose to move to Britain to continue their careers. Even though the allegations of communist conspiracy made against them were groundless, it is also a mark of the industry's relative toleration of left-wing viewpoints that they were employed at all, especially given their notoriety. Ogden Stewart, and Carl Foreman were some of the prominent Americans who continued their careers in Britain after becoming exiles from the United States -as did many exiles from other locations such as Eastern Europe, who were also drawn to Britain and its relative openness to granting work permits to émigrés, whatever their political backgrounds. 10 But, despite these perceptions and royal assurances, how did the British security authorities actually perceive and investigate the risk of communist penetration of their own creative industries during the early Cold War, whether by these 'Un-American' Americans who were now appearing on their shores, or by other leftist involved in the local film and theatre trade? Were they indeed immune to these red scares, or did they in fact just occur more discreetly, carried out in obscure corners of Whitehall rather than in the glare of public testimony? Were lists drawn up, investigations instigated, and careers affected, or were leftists free to carry on their artistic careers unhindered? Indeed, were there actual attempts by the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) to gain a sway amongst such professionals, or was this purely a fantasy conjured by the minds of cold warriors?
This article seeks to shed new light on Britain's security-intelligence response to such concerns, mainly though examining several important archival files recently released by Britain's Security Service, MI5, to the National Archives in Kew, London.
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The core file that will provide the focus for this article is catalogued as KV of others employed in the industry in less prominent roles. However, despite the group's ambitions to increase its membership through organising a range of educational and political events, it appears that the group's actual activity never lived up to such goals: its meetings were sporadic in their frequency and suffered from limited attendance and cancellations, the speakers arranged for the group often appeared to be of only tangential interest, and the whole organisation limped on before finally becoming moribund within a few years of its launch.
Although this short-lived group's activity was inept rather than successful, and while it was quickly forgotten in the annals of Britain's cultural history, the group was subjected to detailed and intensive governmental surveillance and investigation from 1951 until 1954 (with the released file containing no material dating after 1955), with serious debate amongst MI5 officers as to whether it was indeed just an innocuous left-leaning study-group, or instead a secret Party-controlled front designed to develop influence -or even potential spies for the USSR -in the British entertainment industry. Indeed, so serious was MI5's interest that it appears that one of the group's core members was actually run as a secret informant -and the resulting surveillance In what follows, I will use the records that MI5 preserved in order to briefly reconstruct the MacDonald Group's structure, activity and membership, before analysing how MI5 officers interpreted and responded to this group's activity, and ask whether this operation resulted in Britain's own attempts at anti-communist restrictions in the film and theatre trade, which will include examining the released personal files MI5 kept on two other members of this group, Mai Zetterling and Sam Wanamaker.
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In doing so, I will suggest that KV 5/80 not only sheds light on a hitherto little-known industry group, but that it raises broader (and indeed controversial) questions about the conduct of British intelligence operations against supposed communist sympathisers in the entertainment industry during this era.
Formation and objectives
According to MI5's records, the MacDonald Group began its short and erratic life in November 1951 with a small, private meeting held at the home of the actor Ferdy Mayne, where the objectives and ambitions for the group were discussed by the founding members. Remarkably, although only a handful of people attended, the founders of the group had already fundamentally underestimated the reach of the British intelligence services and the extent to which any suspect organisation was being surveilled. For even at this first meeting MI5 already had a source privy to the discussions of group's leadership (whose identity is not revealed in the file, although a possible candidate can be suggested, as I will address later), who provided bountiful detail about those attending the meeting as well as the group's structure and future plans -and then went on, across the life of the group, to provide a constant stream of intelligence. This information allowed MI5 to intimately monitor the operations of the group -although, as will be discussed, the stridency of much of the source's reporting means that many of the claims needed to be evaluated with a highly sceptical eye.
The founding members of the group were Duncan MacDonald, Ferdy Mayne, 13 and Walter Bor (also known as Buchbinder) -'three persons who', the source confidently reported, were 'one hundred per cent communist'. Shelagh Delaney, were arrested and fined as part of the 'Committee of 100' antinuclear protests. 16 At this time, MacDonald and Burke were also involved in a cooperative household at St Julians near Sevenoaks, which for a period counted the Swedish actress Mai Zetterling and her children as residents. Zetterling's autobiography described the household as 'one of the first communities' of this nature 'to grow up outside London', populated by 'Architects, analysts, designers, a film director; it even had its own school'. Her stay there was organised by the actor Herbert Lom ('he was political, he cared') and his group of 'friends' who 'were mainly professors, scientists, artists'. 17 The cooperative household was an organisation that, in itself, had already drawn MI5 and police attention, with the Kent police monitoring it for supposedly being a known community of 'communist[s] or communist sympathisers'. 18 Despite this characterisation, others familiar with the household have strongly rejected any notion that it had far-left political motivations, instead affirming that the house's purpose was to provide communal living facilities for professional couples in order to provide in-house childcare and allow both parents to work (an innovation which appears to have struck police as suspiciously radical at the time). 19 It was also emphasised that MI5's information about the household and its residents was heavily slanted and often mistaken, for MacDonald and Burke, while resident in the house, were not the founders or leaders of the household. 20 Indeed, the later history of St Julians suggests that intelligence and police fears about a nest of communist activity were rather misplaced, for the household evolved, after 1956, into an exclusive private club (The St Julians Club) that still exists on the site today.
Whatever the actual facts, it was believed by MI5 that MacDonald and his wife had links to London's 'progressive' artistic and intellectual communities, and it was the combination of this with his political links that was of great interest and concern to security organs. His seemingly 'Establishment' background as a senior British military officer was compromised by several other facts, including suggestions that he was half Russian by birth, that he was present in Spain during the Civil War, and that he had connections with the CPGB (including apparent attempts to get Party sanction for the discussion group's activity). Smith of the BBC and the writer Olivia Manning (Smith's wife), Jack Murphy of Marks and Spencers, and the scientist Solly (later Baron) Zuckermann. It was suggested that these people could be asked to lecture at meetings of the group on subjects of 'topical interest', and also that they should be amenable to the need for the group to be discreet, with it being specified that 'if any persons attend who are not trusted from a Communist point of view, the Group will be made to appear to be nonsectarian and its lectures to be purely educational'. 27 As will be discussed in the next section, as all these potential lecturers (save Zuckermann) were believed by MI5 to either be Party members or 'crypto' communists, MI5 was immediately sceptical about the 'educational' nature of the events, instead believing it to represent a campaign to subtly indoctrinate people of influence on the stage and screen.
However, if the founders of the group voiced ambitious strategies for expanding the membership, the reality of what it was able to achieve was far more mundane. When the source reported on the second meeting of the group (held in December 1951, again in the home of Mayne), it appears that the bold plans to expand the group's reach had not entirely met with success, with it stated that 'owing to fog the meeting was apparently abandoned since only five persons were present'. 28 The three founders outnumbered the other attendees, Herbert Lom and Bernard Berdchinger (an individual who was, amongst other things, described as an 'unusual personality in the Communist world', 'in the tie business' and 'very interested in Russian development projects'), and MI5's report on the event was padded out with trivialities such as the fact that Berdchinger 'runs a car' and left the meeting in the company of a student 'with red hair' who was 'reported to do some research or clerical work' for him. 29 It appears that, after this setback, the next reported gatherings, in December 1951 and January 1952, were only slightly more successful. by Bor comparing modern architecture in the USSR and the West which was said to consist of 'some excuses for the primitive state of Soviet architecture even at this date'. 33 However, just when it appears some momentum of activity had been achieved, the group then appears to have not met for over a year, 34 leaving the source, in early 1953, only able to relay to MI5 minor titbits such as the fact that Herbert Lom had bought a new house in Wimbledon in which another discussion group attendee was also thought to live. 35 The group was briefly revived in later 1953, with an October meeting at the house of Zetterling (ironically) spending its time hearing 'gramophone records on the American witch hunt', 36 and a November meeting at Mayne's address hearing a talk on 'the problem of Germany'. often inept), a strange, inverse correlation opened between the actual activity of the MacDonald group and the classified discourse generated about the group's possible functions. Convinced that communist sympathisers were covertly organising in the film and theatre worlds, the MacDonald Group was reified by British intelligence as a crucial site to study and assess, leading to pages of analysis, debate, and speculation being generated for the file of this otherwise minor group.
Undoubtedly one of the most hawkish voices was the source providing information to MI5, who cast the reporting in unequivocal terms, insisting that, far from an innocuous social group for left-wing actors, the group's structures were specifically designed for covert cultural penetration. For instance, from the outset the source stressed that MacDonald was organising the group along covert lines, emphasising the 'discretion' that was demanded from all members, and that the group was established with a clear 'two-fold' purpose. This purpose, as explained to MI5, Indeed, the MI5 officer who handled the source appears to have been sceptical about the plausibility of some of the informant's bolder claims, warning in a comment when the report was circulated to others in MI5 that 'We should point out that we have as yet no report on the reactions to their invitation of those people who are to be invited to join or lecture to the Group'. 41 The handler also noted that while it was likely that future lecturers would be aware that the group was a front, it was also conceivable that people could attend it believing it merely to be vaguely left-wing, and thus should not necessarily be regarded as crypto-communists active in British culture on the basis of group membership alone. However, as the source emphatically insisted that only a 'political innocent of scant intelligence' would not recognise the group for what it was, 42 and given that MI5's bureaucratic structures and prevailing political ideology conditioned the organisation to take such threats of communist penetration seriously, 43 these more lurid suspicions about the group's activity took hold, spurring MI5's officers to investigate the group in close detail. A lengthy report submitted in December 1952 sought to emphasise the risk posed by the group, providing a cross-referenced chart to the information held on every member and lecturer, pointing out that twenty-six of the forty members and twelve of the thirteen lecturers were independently verified as being communists or communist-sympathisers. This was held to be more than a coincidence: 'This manifestly Communist composition of the group makes it clear that the M.D.G. is indeed a Communist discussion group, despite its camouflage, and it is reasonable to suppose that anyone attending its meetings or otherwise participating in its activities is likely to be sympathetic to Communism, and susceptible to conversion', with the conclusion that while 'no evidence is available to show whether it is directly controlled or sponsored by the Party' it was nonetheless a group 'authorised' by the Party. 44 The officer's recommendation was thus that 'any of its members or lecturers should…be classed as suspect Communist sympathisers', that records should be acquired and kept on what occurred during meetings of the group, that comprehensive source reports should be compiled on most members of the group, and that an intensive investigation might be launched against MacDonald himself.
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If that was the direct concern and investigative activity, the file also conveys a range of far more nebulous fears that MI5 officers conjured. For one, it was evident that MI5 was concerned about the growing influence of foreign-born communists, with the fears being voiced that Britain's openness to immigrants was drawing undesirables to her shores. Comments on the October meeting 1953 highlighted 'the strong American flavour' of the gathering (attended by people such as Donald Ogden Stewart Jnr. and his step-mother, Ella), and showed concern at the fact that 'there was a growing number of American "progressives" particularly in the Arts, who were Perhaps the most extreme fear attached to the group was the assessment that it presented a likely mode through which Soviet intelligence would seek to penetrate Britain's cultural spheres. This was most explicitly voiced in January 1954, when an MI5 officer concluded, after considering the file and recommending that fellow officers study the group, that this was 'typical of a group within which it is to be expected that recruitment for Russian espionage is likely to take place.' 49 A further concurring assessment of this position stated that the MacDonald group was the sort of group 'from which Soviet spies, informants and supporting agents might well be recruited', and argued that it was similar in structure to many international discussion groups which had been used as recruiting grounds for Soviet intelligence. Such alarmist assessments of the cultural penetration being undertaken by the MacDonald Group, coupled with the source's insistence about the group's sinister motives, suffered only one major problem -namely, as we have seen, the group could barely sustain its own meetings, let alone a wider conspiracy to recruit and subvert the industry as a whole. Despite several years of MI5's investigation, no evidence was ever found that the organisation rose beyond being a rather dull reading group, meeting in living rooms and having trouble attracting more than a few dozen members. Occasionally, this more prosaic explanation would win sway: in February 1952, a meeting was held in MI5 between several officers where the Group was discussed and it was suggested that the activity of the Group should be subjected to downgraded investigations, and some other officers appear to have been less impressed by the risk posed by the group. 53 But such passive monitoring appears to have been too circumspect for other elements of MI5, who continued to regard the group as a key site for surveillanceand even the collapse of the group was not sufficient to deter their interest. In May 1955, the officer running the case provided a brief but extraordinary report on the apparent demise of the Group: 'Source [i.e. MI5's informant] is heavily committed professionally and has been unable to revive the Group. However, when he has more time available, he intends to resuscitate the Group and he will report on the proceedings, statements and the identities of those who attend. It may be, however, that you would prefer Source not to revive this Group '. 54 This is the final entry in the released section of the file, and it is unclear whether the group was indeed resuscitated by the source or whether the revival was blocked. Whatever the case, it provides an amazing document to consider. MI5 had not only monitored the MacDonald Group from the outset, but now their source was actually encouraged to revive and run the group -the very group that was held to be the central mode of liaison between London's cultural spheres and the agencies of communist espionage and subversion.
Like the plot of some le Carré novel, MI5 had come to run the organisation they ostensibly desired to suppress, turning it into a honey-pot luring in unwary leftists to be monitored.
Consequences
If these were the security concerns surrounding the group as a whole, there still remains the question of how association with the group might have actually affected the careers of those MI5 knew to be involved. It should be noted that, while the fears voiced by MI5 officers in these files might seem to rival the fear being voiced in America, the political and cultural climate of anti-communism was considerably different. Without a formal public outlet such as the HUAC hearings, and without a comprehensive private system of industry blacklisting, governmental allegations of communist affiliation did not carry the same career-killing taint as they did in the USA, and many of those that MI5 observed as members of the group appear to have suffered few detrimental effects. Mai Zetterling, for instance, was one of those who came MI5's attention due to her links with MacDonald and his organisations, with a source linking her to both the overt cooperative household at St Julians and as one of the covert members of the MacDonald group. 55 Assessments left little doubt as to where they suspected that her politics fell: 'if her present enthusiasm for extreme Left Wing politics continues, she may well be led to join the Communist Party', and a personal MI5 file was duly opened on Zetterling. 56 However, while MI5 turned to the industry guide, Theatrical Who's Who, to establish Zetterling's particulars, 57 there is no evidence in the file that there were any direct attempts to limit her opportunities for work. Instead, while MI5 remained very interested in her associations with left-wing organisations and 'Un-American Americans', 58 as well as her various romantic involvements, 59 such surveillance remained an information-gathering exercise rather than direct harassment. In 1956, after several years of being the subject of a slowly growing file, Zetterling was recorded as being 'upset emotionally by reports from Hungary' -an event that seemed to mark a turning point in Zetterling's political associations, leaving Zetterling to have a long and successful career as an actor and director with MI5's file on her apparently mothballed. 60 However, association with the MacDonald group did have far more negative implications for many other individuals, particularly in the cases of the American citizens who had fled the USA because of blacklisting, and who were now trying to re-establish their careers in the UK. One notable example was the director Sam Wanamaker, whose MI5 file is another of those that has been released to the National Archvies. Wanamaker's file reveals that he deliberately and pointedly avoided involving himself with any form of communist activity in the UK, obviously attempting to make a clean break from the political associations that had seen his blacklisting in the USA. Unfortunately for Wanamaker, his attendance at a meeting of the MacDonald group early in 1952 was noted by MI5, who were already alert to his status as an 'Un-American' and looking for any sign that he might be politically active in his new home. 61 Therefore, despite the lack of any direct evidence that Wanamaker was interested in establishing links with the Communist Party, the affiliation with the discussion group was interpreted by MI5 as one of the indicators that Wanamaker continued to be sympathetic to communism. This had several major consequences. Wanamaker's 'sympathies lay with communism and that he continued to be active in pursuit of them', 63 and then strenuously resisted further applications to remove the time-limits on his visa. This was a rather obvious distortion of what MI5 knew about Wanamaker, for the surveillance records actually indicated that Wanamaker went to great lengths to avoid any communist activity, but is indicative of a willingness to exaggerate information against left-wing individuals in order to achieve desired political ends -as it was put in another document discussing the broader circle of émigrés, the advantage of pursuing the émigrés in this way was that it might help to break up 'the coterie of American communist sympathisers in the film and theatre world which seems to be forming here', as otherwise MI5 lacked any evidence of them being 'a direct threat to our security'. 64 This harassment followed Wanamaker to the ground level, such as when MI5 wrote to the Chief Constable of Liverpool to warn him that Wanamaker had opened a theatre in the district and was 'one of those "Un-American Americans" who have sought refuge in this country and cannot with equanimity return to the USA', going on to tell the police that there was 'no doubt where his true sympathies lie', and requesting any information the police might receive to be passed on to MI5. 65 
MI5
even recommended to the Home Office that Wanamaker be put on the internment list (and his wife on the restrictions list), in the event of hostilities breaking out against the Soviet Union -a contingency that obviously never came to pass, but still one that shows the extent of the hostility and suspicion with which individuals such as Wanamaker were viewed. 66 The great irony, of course, is that although MI5 viewed Wanamaker as a potential subversive and tried to find ways to exclude him from working in the UK, Wanamaker would go on to be the key figure in re-establishing Shakespeare's Globe Theatre in London -activity that must surely rank as one of the great contributions to English cultural heritage and prestige in the twentieth century, and far from that of a dangerous communist seeking to spread covert influence. However, perhaps the most striking element that emerges from KV 5/80 is not the mere existence of this interaction, but just how entwined and compromised this interaction became -that in the quest to hunt out communist subversion in the film and theatre worlds, MI5 may have become one of the main reasons for its perpetuation. While the secrecy of the discussion group was one of the main factors that generated MI5's suspicions, it is just as plausible that it was this very climate of suspicion, generated by the American HUAC hearings and the perceptions that British authorities might follow suit, that actually drove many of these leftists into such covert groups rather than open meetings. The growth of the file, fuelled by the conspiracy-minded inclinations of the source and certain officers, became selffulfilling proof that a communist conspiracy was under way, whereas the continuation of the file might instead suggest to a calmer mind that it was evidence of an intelligence failure, in that MI5 was unable to come to a plausible assessment of the material they had managed to generate. Indeed, KV 5/80 more plausibly suggests that there was not enough interest amongst British film and theatre intellectuals to spontaneously sustain any such Marxist study group, and that the penetration operations by MI5, rather than minimising the threat, actually ended up sustaining the study group's activity beyond a point where it would have otherwise collapsed. And finally, KV 5/80 suggests that while Britain may have avoided the public ordeals of HUAC, this was not entirely due to the political benevolence of the government apparatus -rather, Britain may have just been more successful in keeping such surveillance activity away from public scrutiny. It should be noted that a number of other British intelligence files relating to those blacklisted by American authorities are slowly being released to the National Archives, London (hereafter PRO) in the Security Service
